A new report, “Military Situation Assessment in Sudan 2025: Analysis of the Battles in the Period from January to February 2025 and Their Impact on the Future of the Crisis in Sudan,” released on Sunday by African Narratives for Strategic Studies, examines the ongoing conflict between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
African Narratives for Strategic Studies is a Pan-African nonprofit policy research organisation committed to reshaping the global understanding of Africa while addressing the continent’s most pressing challenges. With a core focus on democracy, security, energy, economic development and human rights, they amplify African voices and perspectives to foster informed discourse, inspire innovative solutions, and promote sustainable progress. Authored by Political Science Researcher Ahmed Gamal El Sayad, the report assesses the military situation, international reactions, and potential future trajectory of the crisis.
According to African Narratives, Sudan has been embroiled in a violent war since mid-April 2023, resulting in catastrophic consequences. The conflict has precipitated a major humanitarian crisis, marked by the forced displacement of approximately 12 million Sudanese.
These displaced people face shortages of food and medicine, and the war has significantly damaged service sectors such as healthcare. The Sudanese economy has been devastated. Inflation reached 218% in August 2024, compared to 83% before the war. Despite these negative consequences, the conflict continues.
Sudan: 2025 a turning point
The report indicates that since the beginning of 2025, all combat fronts have seen intense battles, resulting in army advances and the recapture of strategically important cities like Umm Rawaba and Wad Madani, the capital of Al-Jazeera State, indicating an improvement in the army’s position on several fronts.
The report details key events and battles. On January 4, 2025, the army began artillery shelling of RSF positions in central Khartoum Bahri. Clashes occurred in the Shambat suburb as part of an attempt to advance towards the Signal Corps and relieve the siege on army headquarters in central Khartoum. Battles broke out on January 8 in the Al-Faw area, between Al-Jazirah and Al-Qadarif states.
The army also made progress in Al-Fasher, seizing several neighbourhoods, and regained control of neighbourhoods in the Al-Fateh area after clashes in southern Omdurman and west of Khartoum. On January 9, the army progressed in Al-Jazeera State, retaking Al-Hajj Abdullah and Al-Shabarga, advancing on the axis to liberate Wad Madani.
A significant development in January 2025 was the army’s recapture of Wad Madani on January 11, inflicting losses on the RSF in Al-Jazeera State. Wad Madani is Sudan’s second largest city and holds economic and population significance due to its location within the Al-Jazeera Project. Battles in Jelei, north of Bahri, resulted in the army controlling the Jelei refinery, 70 kilometres from Khartoum and Sudan’s largest oil refinery. The army advanced, breaking the RSF siege on army headquarters in central Khartoum and the Signal Corps camp.
By the end of January, the army had made progress in Khartoum Bahri after securing the Jelei refinery, regaining control of central and southern Khartoum Bahri, controlling the city entrance from Khartoum, and approaching the Republican Palace.
According to Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Yasser Al-Atta, “Khartoum Bahri has become clean and free of rebellion, from the Jelei refinery in the north to the Mak Nimr Bridge in the south.” Control of Khartoum Bahri is strategically important to the army, securing the River Nile State and reducing risks to Omdurman. The army’s control of the Mak Nimr Bridge enables access to the Republican Palace.
Also at the end of January 2025, the army progressed in North Kordofan State, retaking Umm Rawaba. In early February, fighting continued, with army airstrikes on RSF positions in Nyala, Darfur, on February 3, and violent battles in El Fasher. Fighting continues in Khartoum, especially the Soba Bridge area, where the RSF struggles to maintain control. Army control of this bridge would enable a siege of the RSF, preventing supplies. The report concludes that the military situation from January to early February demonstrates that the army has progressed on multiple fronts.
The army controls the Red Sea, Al-Qadarif, Kassala, and Sennar states completely, and most of the River Nile State, while the conflict intensifies over the states of Kordofan, Al-Jazeera, the White Nile, and Khartoum.
According to the report, since the beginning of 2025, various international and regional actors have reacted to the Sudan war. The US administration imposed sanctions on RSF leaders, citing human rights violations and violence against civilians, and sanctioned Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sovereignty Council and commander of the Sudanese army, allegedly as leverage to promote peace negotiations. The Egyptian Foreign Minister visited Port Sudan in early January, stressing Cairo’s commitment to ending the war and achieving stability in Sudan. The Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister visited Sudan, presenting the Turkish initiative as a step to end the war and support Sudan’s stability.
On February 8, al-Burhan announced the imminent formation of a transitional government. DNE Africa quoted al-Burhan as saying, “The coming period will witness the formation of a government to complete the tasks of the transition, and this government can be called a caretaker government, or a war government.”
He stated that the purpose of this government will be to eliminate the Rapid Support Forces, and rejected a ceasefire in light of the continued siege of major cities like El Fasher by the RSF. From al-Burhan’s statements, the report infers that fighting will continue.
The report concludes that the Sudanese crisis remains complex, and that international and regional reactions to the crisis have had limited impact. Ultimately, Sudan’s future is uncertain and dependent on battlefield developments.
