Over the past decade, India’s foreign policy has expanded well beyond South Asia.
Through the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), New Delhi is helping shape new trade routes linking India with the Gulf and Europe. Through I2U2, it has strengthened cooperation with Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the United States. Through SAGAR, it has placed maritime security at the centre of its regional vision.
India’s interests have grown. The question is whether its policy towards the Horn of Africa has grown with them.
The Horn of Africa India faces today is not the one it faced ten years ago. The Red Sea has become one of the world’s busiest waterways. Maritime security has become more urgent. Competition for influence has intensified. Trade, security and regional politics are now more closely connected than before. For India, that changes the picture.
For many years, India’s priorities in the Horn were clear: protect maritime trade, combat piracy, support regional stability and maintain constructive relations across the region. That approach served India well. The question is whether it is still enough.
Part of the answer lies in the direction of India’s wider foreign policy. IMEC looks west. I2U2 looks west. India’s commercial interests increasingly look west. The Horn of Africa sits across that path. That is difficult to ignore.
The region itself is changing. Pakistan has strengthened defence cooperation with Somalia, joining Turkey, Egypt and Qatar among Somalia’s principal security partners. None of these developments, on their own, changes the regional balance. Taken together, however, they point in one direction. More countries now see the Horn of Africa as a place where long-term interests are worth protecting. It is reasonable to ask whether India’s own approach has kept pace.
There is another trend worth noting. Two of India’s closest partners have already adjusted their policies. The United Arab Emirates recognised Berbera’s commercial potential through its investment in DP World. Israel recognised Somaliland’s growing importance as the Red Sea became more central to its security thinking. Those were different decisions, taken for different reasons. Yet they point towards the same conclusion. The Horn of Africa matters more today than it did a decade ago. India already works closely with both countries. It is reasonable to ask whether its own engagement with the region should evolve as well.
This is not an argument about recognition. Recognition is a political decision. The question here is whether New Delhi’s policy reflects its own interests. Somaliland is part of that discussion. Not because of politics alone. Because of its location. Because of Berbera Port. Because of maritime security. Because of its growing economic links with Ethiopia. These are practical considerations.
Foreign policy works best when political relationships, commercial interests and security priorities move in the same direction. When they do not, opportunities are often taken by others. India has spent years building partnerships across the Gulf and
the wider Indo-Pacific. It is reasonable to ask whether its policy towards the Horn of Africa has kept pace. Maintaining the status quo is itself a policy choice.
Foreign policy rarely becomes outdated overnight. It becomes outdated when national interests change while policy remains anchored in earlier assumptions. India’s interests have expanded westwards. The Horn of Africa has become more important to those interests. It may be time to look at the region through that wider lens.
Bashe Awil Omar is a former Representative of Somaliland to the United Arab Emirates and Kenya. He advises on investment, trade and strategic affairs across the Horn of Africa and the Gulf.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in DNE Africa Opinion section are those of the writers and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of DNE Africa.
